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PATENTS
INTRODUCTION
Beginning October 1, 1982, as a result of the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982,1 jurisdiction over patent appeals was transferred from the
traditional federal circuit courts of appeals to the newly established United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2 Although this reorganiza-
tion does not necessarily assure protection for the inventor or the infringer, it
may impose more uniformity and predictability on the patent appeals pro-
cess. As one commentator noted, the present system, with the Second Cir-
cuit upholding only 4.8% of challenged patents and the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits forty percent, encourages forum-shopping.3 Furthermore, this dis-
parity in judgments suggests that either Fourth and Fifth Circuit inventors
are eight times more adept at developing noninfringable patents than those
in the Second Circuit, or that judges are injecting their own philosophical
biases into the age-old controversy of whether creativity should be en-
couraged 4 or whether monopolies should be discouraged.
The loss of patent appeal jurisdiction will have little impact on the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, because in recent years the court adjudi-
cated few infringement cases. During the recent term, for instance, the court
decided only three patent appeals, and one of those5 related only tangen-
tially to the subject. In the other two cases, Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 6
and Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corp. v. Farmland Industries, Inc. ,7 the appellate
court did not establish any new standards for judging patentability, but
rather adhered to established criteria. Indeed, Johns-Manville is a veritable
compendium of the current state of patent law.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
2. Section 1295 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 provides in part:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction-
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States
• . . I if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section
1338 of this title [28 U.S.C. § 13381 ....
28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982). 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) referred to in this section
authorizes original jurisdiction in the district courts of the United States over patent matters.
3. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
449-50 (2d ed. 1981).
4. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that "[tlhe Congress shall have power .... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
5. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1981), in
which the plaintiff sought to force a third party, Cybernetic Systems, Inc., to divulge the techni-
cal details of a secret computer program as evidence in an infringement suit. The federal d;s-
trict court judge ordered disclosure and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that the right to an
industrial secret is outweighed by the need for evidence in the infringement suit. Id at 326.
6. 668 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2298 (1982).
7. 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. dened, 103 S. Ct. 132 (1982).
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I. THE JOHNS-MANVILLE CASE
A. Facts
Lam, Inc., the plaintiff-appellee injohns-Manville, in 1973 patented a
lighting fixture which permits the use of a high intensity discharge (HID)
lamp without objectionable glare in rooms with average ceiling height. First
developed in the 1930s, the HID lamp uses only one-eighth the energy of
incandescent or fluorescent lights with equivalent luminosity, but because of
objectionable glare its use had been restricted to outdoors or to buildings
with extremely high ceilings. Lam's invention, an elliptical-shaped optical
refractor which projects radiation upwards, then horizontally, essentially
turns the whole ceiling into a large lighting fixture with no glare.8
For several years, Johns-Manville researchers had tried unsuccessfully to
develop an HID lamp equivalent to Lam's. In 1976 Johns-Manville person-
nel acquired a blueprint and a brochure (containing patent right warnings)
of the plaintiff's invention. Within days, Johns-Manville researchers copied
Lam's design, constructed a prototype, and used it to underbid the plaintiff
for a large lighting contract. 9 Before the sale was consummated, Lam noti-
fied Johns-Manville of its infringement, but Johns-Manville "stonewalled,"
threatening the plaintiff with litigation expenses of at least $150,000.10 In
the subsequent suit, the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado ruled that Lam's patent was valid, and that Johns-Manville willfully
infringed, awarding treble damages and attorneys' fees, and enjoining Johns-
Manville from further infringement.I Johns-Manville's contentions on ap-
peal, which the Tenth Circuit characterized as only "plausible,"' 2 represent
virtually the entire gamut of infringement defenses. Singularly unimpressed
with the defense's arguments, the court affirmed the district court's
decision. 13
B. The Decision
1. Validity of the Patent
Attacking the validity of the patent, Johns-Manville contended on ap-
peal that the invention was anticipated by prior art "4 the most relevant of
which the patent examiner failed to consider, that the invention was unpat-
8. 668 F.2d at 466-67.
9. Id at 467-68.
10. Id at 475.
11. Id at 465.
12. Id at 475.
13. Id at 476.
14. Id at 468. Sections 102(a) & (b) of the Patent Act of 1952 provide:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1976).
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entable because of obviousness,' 5 and that the lighting fixture had been in
public use or for sale for more than a year prior to the patent application.'
6
The Tenth Circuit court rejected all three claims.
17
Although the court agreed that the Patent Act' 8 denies entitlement to a
patent if the invention is anticipated by prior art, 19 it nevertheless upheld
the trial court's finding that the lighting devices cited by the defendant
Johns-Manville were not relevant in the case because they distributed light
differently and were "much less desirable."'20 Satisfied that prior art had not
anticipated the Lam invention, the court analyzed the obviousness claim by
applying the secondary tests specified by the United States Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere.2 ' These tests include considerations such as "com-
mercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others .... -22 The
court determined that the Lam invention was not obvious, citing "Lam's, J-
M's Ujohns-Manville's], and McGraw-Edison's difficulty in developing a
[lamp] that would allow use of an HID unit in low-ceilinged rooms, and the
commercial need for the unit, as evidenced by J-M's immediate design of the
CLASSPAK product line, the obvious efficiencies of the unit, and its early
sales success."
23
In response to the defendant's final claim that the plaintiffis lamp had
been in public use for over a year, the court noted that the only exposure of
his invention was to a lighting engineer who evaluated the device.24 Apply-
ing the experimental use doctrine stated in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys,
Inc. ,25 the court rejected the defense: "It is well settled that '[t]he good faith
use of the device . . . for experimental purposes is not a public use within
the intent and meaning of the statute.' "26
2. Enforceability
Johns-Manville contended Lam's patent was unenforceable because the
15. 688 F.2d at 468. Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states:
[a] patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
16. 688 F.2d at 470. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
17. 688 F.2d at 476.
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
19. Id. § 102(a), (b).
20. 668 F.2d at 469.
21. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
22. Id It should be noted that there is no particular limit to these so-called tests. One
observer stated that "[t]o characterize these points as 'subtests' tends to obscure the fact that
they are not tests at all, only inferential bases, and that any evidence should be admissible if it
can support the inference of non-obviousness." P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 452.
23. 668 F.2d at 470.
24. Id
25. 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
26. 668 F.2d at 470 (quoting McCullough Tool Co., 343 F.2d at 394). See also Elizabeth v.




inventor failed to reveal relevant prior art and because he misrepresented his
lamp as being utilized in rooms with ceilings as low as eight to nine feet,
when in fact it required a room with a ceiling at least ten feet high. 2 7 The
court, citing its decision in True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp. ,28 agreed
that a patent is unenforceable if it is obtained through fraud or bad faith.
2 9
The court ruled, however, that the prior art the plaintiff failed to reveal was
justifiably considered irrelevant by both Lam's engineer and the patent ex-
aminer.3 0  In addition, the court stated that the only evidence indicating
that the lamp could not be used in rooms with ceilings under ten feet was
sufficiently ambiguous that it would not support a claim of intentional mis-




Johns-Manville claimed that file wrapper estoppel3 3 precluded any
charge that it had infringed3 4 the patent either literally or under the
equivalents doctrine.3 5 The Tenth Circuit ruled that "[w]hether a device
literally infringes or is the equivalent, and whether the patent holder is sub-
ject to file wrapper estoppel are questions of fact. We will not set aside the
trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous."'3 6 Because the court
found that the Johns-Manville device was the equivalent of Lam's invention,
it did not address the question of literal infringement, although it found the
two lamps extremely similar. Johns-Manville emphasized that it character-
ized its reflector bowl's surface as approximating a parabola rather than an
ellipse as claimed in Lam's file wrapper,3 7 but the trial court said the two
surfaces were so similar that "a sharp pencil can hardly differentiate between
the lines of the two bowls." 3 The Tenth Circuit found the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's conclusion that the patent had been infringed, and
27. 668 F.2d at 470-71.
28. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).




33. File wrapper estoppel precludes a person in an infringement suit from claiming for his
invention characteristics which he failed to claim in his patent application, or which he surren-
dered to gain approval of his patent by the examiner. Additionally he may not recapture any of
the claims he surrendered by claiming the doctrine of equivalents. See generally Straussler v.
United States, 290 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Note, The Interplay of the Doctn'zes of
Eqwannts and File Wrapper Estoppel, 29 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 917 (1961), for a good discussion
on the relationship between these two concepts.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976) states in part, "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, in-
fringes the patent."
35. For a thorough discussion of the equivalents doctrine, see generally Graver Tank v.
Linde Air, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). "The theory on which it [equivalentsdoctrine] is founded is
that 'if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substan-
tially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.'" Id
at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878)).
36. 668 F.2d at 472 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc.,
623 F.2d 645, 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980)).
37. 668 F.2d at 472.






Finally, the Tenth Circuit court held that treble damages were appro-
priate because the infringement was intentional. 4° Observing that Johns-
Manville did not even acquire a copy of Lam's patent before it duplicated
his lamp, the court noted, "for all J-M [Johns-Manville] knew, Lam's surface
may have 'approximated a parabola.' Later, when Lam claimed infringe-
ment, J-M was able to develop plausible arguments for no infringement.
4 1
The court further suggested that the defendant may have evidenced bad
faith by threatening the plaintiff with $150,000 litigation expenses if it pur-
sued its claim. The court said, "[wihile we hesitate to attribute too much to
statements made during heated discussions, like the trial court we find offen-
sive such threats by a large company to a small one."
'42
II. THE SWIFT CASE
In Swi Agricultural Chemicals Corp. v. Farmland Industries, Inc. ,'43 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court decision a a declaring the pat-
ent holder's patent invalid for obviousness and anticipation, and ruling that
even if the patent had been valid, there was no infringement because of file
wrapper estoppel. Previously the patent holder had prevailed in an infringe-
ment action involving the same patent.
4 5
Swift's patent involved a process for making ammonium polyphosphate
(APP), a fertilizer, from phosphoric acid. The defendant's process used
superphosphoric acid. Because Swift, in its patent application specifically
designated its process as using ordinary phosphoric acid rather than
superphosphoric acid, the court determined that the patent, even if it were
valid, was not infringed because of file wrapper estoppel.A
In affirming the invalidity of the Swift patent for producing APP, the
appeals court cited five patented processes extant at the time the appellant
developed his method.4 7 All involved procedures for reacting the same
39. Id at 474.
40. Id at 476. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.
41. Id
42. Id at 475.
43. 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), ceri. denied, 103 S. Ct. 132 (1982).
44. Swift Agricultural Chem. Corp. v. Farmland Indus. Corp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 1295 (D.
Kan. 1980), afd, 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
45. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 10 (E.D. La. 1977) (Usamex
1); Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. La. 1980) (Usamex II),
aed, 646 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. 674 F.2d at 1353. For a discussion of file wrapper estoppel, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
47. Id at 1353-55.
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chemicals in very similar manners to produce APP. Thus, the court ruled
Swift's patent invalid because it was anticipated by prior art, or with differ-




48. Id at 1355-56.
[Vol. 60:2
